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Abstract: China’s collective forestland tenure reform has dramatically affected the business
environment of domestic forest product firms. This study examines the impact of the said reform
on the expected values of these firms, via the reaction of investors (as seen on the stock markets)
towards the issuance of related policies. Based on signaling theory and the assumption that the
Chinese stock markets are efficient in terms of work form, this study adopts an event study method
and examines five policies during the 2003–2009 period. The numbers of forest product firms used in
the examinations herein differ among the policies and range from 21 to 29. This study found that the
policies have differentially affected the expected values of forest product firms and that the impact on
firms lacking forestland holdings is generally more significant than that on firms that hold forestland.
The findings of this study enhance our understanding of the effect of collective forestland tenure
reform on the value of forest product firms; they also have implications on forest product firms as
they work to adapt to the reform.
Keywords: forestland tenure reform; forestland ownership; event study; abnormal return; forest
product firm
1. Introduction
The majority of China’s forestland is collectively owned [1]. The legal owners of the collective
forestland are administrative villages that consist of a number of natural villages or villager families [2].
China has sought to devolve the collectives’ forestland management responsibilities to individual
households to improve the performance of the collective forestland [3]. Particularly, the collective
forestland tenure reform initiated in 2003 is considered successful, as it clarifies the ownership of
forestland, regulates the transfer of forestland ownership, and improves the forest timber logging
management system, inter alia [2,4].
Among the actions being taken on account of the tenure reform initiated in 2003, clarifying
forestland ownership, which includes the issuance of forestland ownership certificates, tends to be one
of the primary tasks [5]. When that ownership is clarified, forestland-use rights can be reallocated
by means of transferring or leasing to forest product firms or other forestland users, to improve
the performance of the collective forestland [6]. The area of land involved in transferred collective
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forestland has been increasing over the years, ever since the initial launch of the collective forestland
tenure reform in 2003; as of the end of 2015, that area was at 283 million mu (18.87 million ha) [7].
Such flexible forestland management under the tenure reform is likely to affect the business
environment of the forest product industry, whose business activities, such as paper-making,
timber-processing, and furniture-manufacturing, which rely on the provision of forest resources [8–10].
The collective forestland tenure reform would affect both the quantity and quality of forest
resources [11,12], which would, in turn, impact the forest product industry. In addition, forest
product firms that own forestland enjoy strategic and competitive advantages; in particular, it has long
been recognized that owning timberland is critical to a forest product firm’s profitability and positive
valuation [13,14]. This is because timberland ownership improves these firms’ return on assets and
earnings stabilization, and their ability to respond to uncertainty and mitigate risk [15].
However, there is a lack of empirical research on the impact of China’s collective forestland tenure
reform on the value of financial forest product firms. Additionally, few studies differentiate firms that
already hold forestland from those that do not. Since these policies affect the holding of forestland by
allowing ownership transfers, firms that do not hold forestland might respond differently from those
that do. It would also be interesting to compare the impact of these policies between firms with and
without forestland holdings.
This study adopted an event study method to assess the effects of the collective forestland tenure
reform policies on forest product firm value. Studies within the literature adopt this method to analyze
the effects of forestland policies and related events on the value of forest product firms. For example,
Niquidet used event study techniques to analyze the impact of announcements pertaining to the
Forestry Revitalization Plan, which touches upon the reallocation of forestland tenure, as implemented
by the government of British Columbia, Canada, on the value of publicly traded forest product
firms [16].
The current study thus looks to examine how policies relating to China’s collective forestland
tenure reform have affected the value of forest product firms, as reflected in stock market prices. It is
important to understand the impact of collective forestland tenure reform policies on forest product
firms in China. First, it would help to gather empirical evidence regarding the effects of tenure reform
on forest product firms; this evidence would be particularly helpful for policy-makers as they craft
policy vis-à-vis the development of the forest product industry sector, such as that which accompanies
the reform and promotes that industry’s development. Second, findings from the current study may
shed light on the effects of the reform on the development of the forest product industry and thus
inform forest product firms as they adapt to the changing environment.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the background and
theoretical foundations of this study. Section 3 outlines this study’s research methodology, including
that pertaining to data collection and analysis; this is followed in Section 4, with the presentation and
discussion of the analytical results. Finally, Section 5 presents the current study’s contributions to
the literature, the policy implications of its findings, and the study’s limitations, and offers future
research directions.
2. Background and Theoretical Development
2.1. The Collective Forestland Tenure Reform and Its Effect
Chinese forestland is owned either by the state or by village collectives. Approximately 60% of
China’s forestland is collectively owned [17]. During the 1980s, most of the collective forestland was
contracted to individual households through the implementation in rural areas of the “Household
Responsible System.” However, the collective forestland tenure reform at that time was incomplete and
still insecure, and this resulted in the marginalization of both individual-level rights and the interests
of collective forestland tenure [18]. In such circumstances, households and collective villages lack
incentives to manage collective forestland [9].
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Before 1998, forestland owned by the state that mainly comprised natural forestland represented a
large proportion of China’s domestic timber supply. Following the 1998 flash floods from the Yangtze
and other waterways, the National Forest Protection Program (NFPP)—-which is in essence a logging
ban on natural forestland—-was implemented. Timber harvests from state-owned natural forestland
dropped dramatically, and this stimulated a shift of domestic timber production from state-owned
natural forestland to collective forestland [19].
To boost the productivity of collective forestland, the Chinese government initiated in 2003 the
collective forestland tenure reform, as part of the “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China on accelerating the development of forestry.” This round of reforms was designed to
give individual farmers some secure and transferable rights to use, lease, or mortgage forestland for
70 years; these rights are protected by a legal contract and through the issuance of forestland tenure
certificates. Such a decentralization strategy is likely to lead this round of tenure reform to success [20].
In 2008, the Chinese government announced “The State Council’s decision on promoting the collective
forestland tenure reform,” which officially launched nationwide reform processes for privately owned
collective forestland. This decision authorized unprecedented local autonomy for the reallocation
and management of collective forestland; it also formally permitted land transfers, together with a
goal to develop land transfer markets to complement the tenure reform [17]. Meanwhile, a series of
supporting policies supplement the two aforementioned milestone policies [21].
The ultimate goal of the collective forestland tenure reform is to increase domestic timber supply
by enhancing forestland quality and productivity and providing an incentive to invest in forestland
by claiming a secure forestland tenure [5,22,23]. Indeed, the collective forestland tenure reform has
been found to encourage investment among farmer households in forestland [24,25]. Additionally,
the collective forestland tenure reform has boosted collective forestland’s contribution to China’s
domestic timber production. The collective forestland has, in the recent past, been the source of 46%
of China’s domestic wood supply [26]. With the initial implementation of the NFPP in 1998, timber
production from state-owned forest gradually decreased, while that from collective forestland has
gradually increased [27]. Such trends are especially obvious in the policy’s second phase, which
started in 2010 (Figure 1). One should note that, since 2003, the Chinese government has been slowly
phasing out the annual cutting allowance, which has, in turn, helped gradually increase total timber
production [27]. However, it did not seem to lead to any obvious increase in timber production from
state-owned forestland. One could, therefore argue, to some extent, that the contribution of collective
forestland to timber production has grown over the years.
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Figure 1. China’s total domestic timber production and the contribution of state-owned forestland.
Notes: (1) Data sources: Chi a Fo stry Statistical Yearbook, 1998–2014; state-owned forestland timber
production data are drawn from data on 135 key state-owned timber harvesting firms and 20 key
state-owned forestland management bureaus. (2) Given the impact of the freezing rain and snow
disaster and earthquakes, timber production in 2008 increased dramatically and returned to normal
levels in 2009 [27].
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Evidence from academia shows similar results. Yin and Xu found that timber harvests have
increased in those provinces where the collective forestland tenure reform has been implemented [11].
Specifically, based on Zhang and Buongiorno’s [28] assessment, it appears that this reform increased
China’s timber supply by 18% wherever it was implemented. It was also found that with the
implementation of the collective forestland tenure reform, timber prices have been in decline; this can
be partially explained by the increase in timber supply that stemmed from the reform [29].
The tenure reform has also boosted the transfer or lease of forestland, making it possible for forest
product firms to have control over collective forestland by means of leasing, contracting, cutting rights
arrangements, and cooperation [4]. Forestland transfers are essential to long-term investment and the
preservation of tropical hardwood trees [30]. Whenever the operation rights of collective forestland are
transferred or leased to outside enterprises, these firms may pursue more intensive levels of forestland
use—levels that had not been previously possible for local households [6].
2.2. Structure-Conduct-Performance Model
The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) model is one of the main analytical approaches used
by industry organizations, and it can be applied to industry-wide and specific sectors alike. The SCP
model argues that a sector’s structure affects its performance, either directly or through conduct [15,31].
A sector’s structure includes the number and size of sellers and buyers, the cost structure, the degree
of vertical integration, barriers to entry, and the degree of product differentiation. Here, “conduct”
refers to investments, price-setting, research and development, and the like. Performance manifests in
various efficiency measures (e.g., prices and profit distribution) [15,31].
Inherent in the SCP model is the argument that factors, such as governance arrangements
and regulations are key determining factors of market structure, conduct, and performance [15,32].
The underlying thinking here is that firms can achieve competitive advantages by responding to the
composition and dynamics of their own sector [33]. For example, Owubah et al. applied the SCP
model to forestland ownership and found that in Ghana, there is a direct relationship between tenure
structure and performance in terms of sustainable forestry practices [30]. Additionally, the results of
Zhang and Binkley’s [34] study show that forestland policy changes in British Columbia have not had
any significant economic impact on the forest product firms there; on the other hand, another study by
Binkley and Zhang found that a timber-fee increase policy had a general and negative impact on forest
product firms in British Columbia [35].
Likewise, it could be argued that government policies relating to forestland tenure are likely
to affect forest product firms’ financial performance. Niquidet found that the announcement of the
Forestry Revitalization Plan by the British Columbia government was found to have a significant
adverse effect on forest product firms there, owing to the loss of forestland tenure and the difficulties
associated with translating property rights into forest resources in Canada [16].
2.3. Raw Material Supply and Forestland Ownership
Access to and control over raw production materials are especially important and serve as
competitive advantages among firms in the natural resource sector, to which forest product firms
belong [36]. Lähtinen et al. assessed the relative importance of various resources in the forest product
industry, using sawmills as an example; they found that, among all the resources that a sawmill
requires, raw materials are ranked as most important [14]. Likewise, a lack of raw materials, problems
in acquiring raw materials, and increases in raw material prices are among the key causes of firm
failure in the forestry sector [37]. In particular, it is critical that wood industry firms secure raw material
if they are to produce higher-priced commodities and tailored services [38].
For all these reasons, forest product firms tend to gain control of the raw material supplies
derived from stable timber supply production. They do so to obtain competitive advantages, including
returns on timberland, earnings stabilization, risk reduction, and supply assurance, among other
benefits [14,15,39]. Having its own raw material supply as a backup helps a firm increase its price
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negotiation power in timber markets and reduce the risk of a raw material price increase [36]. When
timber prices are high, firms can use more of their own timber, and, conversely, firms can buy timber
on open markets [15].
In situations where a forest product firm reports forestland as an asset or otherwise under its
control (e.g., through leasing, contracting, cutting rights arrangements, and cooperation), that firm is
said to have “forestland ownership” [36,39]. Owning timberland is critical to a forest product firm’s
profitability and valuation, as it provides the firm with raw production materials and the ability to
respond more effectively to market fluctuations [13,38]. Moreover, holding industrial timberland can
improve management’s ability to make decisions that enhance the firm’s long-term financial success
by reducing dependence on raw material sources on the open market [13,15]. As a result, holding
forestland is likely to affect the financial performance of forest product firms. Li and Zhang empirically
examined how holding timberland relate to the financial performance of US forest product firms; they
found that timberland ownership improves these firms’ profitability (in terms of return on assets and
price-earnings ratio) and their ability to respond to uncertainty [15].
It should be noted, however, that holding forestland may have a negative effect on a firm’s
financial performance because timber production is capital-intensive and large amounts of capital can
be tied to timberland [39]. Besides, forest product firms tend to feature high asset specificity and a lack
of flexibility [36,39], which means that the value of production facilities would diminish if production
were suspended on account of a lack of available wood and related raw materials [13]. In addition,
internal organization costs may increase when industrial timberland holdings are large [15].
In summary, the primary objective of this study is to examine the effect of collective forestland
tenure reform policies on the financial performance of forest product firms in China. Given the notion
that the acquisition, integration, and deployment of resources as determined by forestland ownership
might explain variance in firm performance [36], this research further examines whether the effect
differs between firms that do and do not hold forestland.
2.4. Event Study Method
Financial economists use the event study method to assess the effect of a specific event on a firm’s
financial performance, and on its firm value as reflected in stock price variations. The event study
method was developed on the basis of signaling theory [40] and the efficient market hypothesis [41].
Signaling theory holds that in the absence of complete and accurate information, decision-makers will
interpret observable factors or a signal revealed by a sender, and adjust their purchasing behavior
accordingly [40]. The efficient market hypothesis implies that the revelation of information about a
specific event would trigger an instant fluctuation in the stock price [41]; in other words, the stock
market response represents the value derived from the delivered signal [42]. Relating the influence of
the signal sent by an event to the reaction of the stock market allows one to determine whether the
event provides stock market participants with valuable information [43]. The current market value of
a firm reflects investor perception of the present value of all future benefits to the firm, in both the
long and short term. Therefore, the effect of an event on a firm’s stock price can be determined by the
difference between the actual and predicted returns, which is often called the “abnormal return” [42].
The event study method is appropriate for the current study, given its power to explore linkages
between events and firm values; additionally, it is a powerful means by which to examine how stock
market participants assess the informativeness of an event [42,44]. Studies within the literature have
analyzed the effect of forestland policies and related events on the financial performance of forest
product firms by adopting an event study methodology. Prior research in the forestry economics field
that leveraged the event study method is summarized in the Appendix A.
As shown in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix A, these studies mainly examined stock markets in
North America, which are mostly considered mature markets and where the efficient market hypothesis
applies [45,46]. Chinese stock markets can also be considered efficient, although that efficiency is
in a somewhat weak form [47–49]. As an emerging economy, China has attempted to advance its
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stock markets via a series of regulatory transformations, and this has led over the years to efficiency
improvements in its stock markets [50–53]. Thus, to some extent, the event study method is suitable for
investigating the Chinese stock market’s reaction to various events, such as environmental policies [54],
corporate social responsibility initiatives [55], and environmental violation events [56]. Therefore, the
event study method can be used to analyze the effects of announcements pertaining to the collective
forestland tenure reform and related policies in China on the forest product firm values of interest in
this study.
Consistent with other studies that have examined the stock market reaction to forestland-related
policies, this study follows a standard event study method. Events of interest, event windows, and
selected forest product firms were first identified, followed by the measurement of abnormal returns
and their aggregations across time and firms.
3. Methodology
3.1. Defining the Event
The events of interest in this study are the release of policies relating to the collective forestland
tenure reform in China that directly affect either collective forestland tenure or timber supply. According
to the Center for the Collective Forestland Tenure Reform of the State Forestry Administration, there
were five policies relating to collective forestland tenure reform on forestland ownership and timber
supply between 2003 and 2009 [21]. Each policy was treated as an event, with the date of release used
as the event date. The selected policies and their key terms are described below.
Policy I: Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on accelerating the
development of forestry (date: 25 June 2003)
• Encourage the development of collective forestland
• Improve the forestland tenure system
• Accelerate the promotion of upgrades to the structure of the forestry industry, and encourage the
development of the timber production base
• Enhance the guidance and control of forestry industry development, and promote management
schemes (such as firms working with the timber production base, and the timber production base
working with farmers)
Policy II: Notice of the State Forestry Administration on further strengthening and standardizing
the management of forestland rights registration and certification (date: 8 February 2007)
• Enhance the registration process and the issuance of forestland certificates
Policy III: Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on promoting
the collective forestland tenure reform (date: 8 June 2008)
• Clarify forestland property rights and reaffirm forestland ownership to individual households,
with official licenses issued to individual households
• Issue forestland certificates
• Clarify forestland ownership
• Reallocate and manage collective forestland, and also formally permit land transfers
• Regulate the transfer of forestland and timber, and the development of land transfer markets
• Improve the forest-wood logging management system
Policy IV: Opinions of the State Forestry Administration on the reform and improvement of
collective forestland logging management (date: 17 July 2009)
• Simplify the processes of forest-wood logging management
• Improve management of the logging cut allowance
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Policy V: Opinions of the State Forestry Administration on strengthening the management of
collective forestland rights transfer (date: 15 October 2009)
• Build a regulated and ordered mechanism for the transfer of collective forestland rights
• Build an efficient platform by which to transfer collective forestland rights
3.2. Determining the Event Window
This study uses a three-day event window consisting of the day of the announcement, the
preceding trading day, and the trading day following the announcement day. This window was chosen
because it is likely to lead to reliable results: when the event window is increased beyond three days,
the power of the estimation model decreases [57,58]. Moreover, with a longer-term event window,
there might be confounding events within the same period that could also affect a firm’s market value.
Choosing a shorter event window can help reduce the likelihood of stock price data from the event
window being contaminated by confounding events such as those pertaining to dividends, earnings,
mergers/acquisitions, and changes in top management [57,58].
The current study uses a 250-day estimation period, starting 252 days before and ending two
days before the date of the announcement. (Roughly speaking, 250 days is the number of trading
days in one calendar year.) Using such a relatively long estimation period can reduce the influence of
possible seasonal stock price movements [59]. Additionally, a shorter estimation period may have too
few observations for estimating the parameters, which are discussed below [60].
3.3. Calculating Abnormal Returns
The event study method measures abnormal returns observed when an event announcement
is made public with regard to normal returns expected in the absence of the event. An abnormal
return measured over the event window is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR). To measure
the aforementioned change in a firm’s financial performance, as triggered by collective forestland
tenure reform policy events, the normal rate of returns was estimated via the approach of Brown and
Warner [61]. The stock return of firm i on day (i.e., Rit), and the stock return of the market portfolio on
day t (i.e., Rmt), are first calculated using Equations (1) and (2), respectively, where Pit is the stock price
of firm i on day t and Pmt is the stock market price index on day t.
Rit =
Pit
Pit−1
− 1 (1)
Rmt =
Pmt
Pmt−1
− 1 (2)
Then, according to the efficient market hypothesis [41], the return of a specific stock can be
presented as a function of the market portfolio, as in Equation (3), where Rit represents the return of
stock i on day t; Rmt is the return of the market portfolio on day t; αi and βi are the intercept and slope
parameters, respectively, of firm i; and εit is the disturbance term for stock i on day t. These parameters
are estimated using stock price data observations over the 250-day period that ends two business days
before the events (i.e., day (–2)). Then, a regression is run for Rit on Rmt (as shown in Equation (3))
to derive α̂, and β̂ (in Equation (4)). Finally, the normal rate of return of firm i on day t (i.e., R̂it) is
calculated by Equation (4).
Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit (3)
R̂it = α̂i + β̂iRmt (4)
The abnormal rate of return for firm i on day t within the event window (T1:T2) is derived using
Equation (5). Then, the CAR for stock i over the event window is calculated as per Equation (6), while
for a sample of n stocks the average CAR over the event window is represented by Equation (7), where
N is the number of firms included in the sample or subsample. Furthermore, to examine whether the
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overall return is abnormal for each day of the event window, the stock price reaction can be tested for
significance, by using Equation (8).
ARit = Rit − R̂it (5)
CARi =
T2∑
T1
ARit (6)
CAR =
1
N
T2∑
T1
CARi(T1,T2) (7)
z =
average of CARi
standard deviation/
√
N
(8)
3.4. Data Description
Given that forest product firms are exposed to the impact of policies relating to forest product
industries at large, a thorough search was required to identify any suspicious policy announcements
released during the five-event windows defined in this study. Confounding policies might relate to
tariffs on forest products and related commodities, forestland certification, and the like. The search
for confounding policies was conducted on major websites relating to the forest product industry,
including the National Forestry Administration (http://www.forestry.gov.cn/), the Chinese Forestry
Industry Association (http://www.chinalycy.org/), and the China National Forest Products Industry
Association (http://www.cnfpia.org/). In addition, the production of forest resources is vulnerable
to major natural disasters, which would affect the supply of raw materials for the forest product
industry. The records of natural disasters in the China Forestry Yearbook (2004, 2008–2010) were closely
examined for any occurrence of natural disasters during the event windows, such as freezing rain,
snow, and earthquakes. No confounding policy or major natural disaster was found, and so this study
retained the five events and their time windows for further analysis.
According to the China Securities Regulatory Commission’s industry classification guidelines for
publicly traded firms, the forest product industry comprises timber product manufacturing, bamboo
and grass production, furniture production, and the making of paper and paper products. This study
used the Wind Terminal database to identify the industry category of each firm by following the Wind
Industry Classification Standard. This standard is based on the Global Industry Classification Standard,
with minor amendments to accommodate the characteristics of publicly traded firms in China [62].
The Global Industry Classification Standard has been widely used in stock market research and is
considered a better choice for financial analysts and investors than other industry classifications [63,64].
Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the use of the Wind Industry Classification Standard aligns
well with this study objective (i.e., understanding investors’ behavior in the stock market). In this
sense, it can be argued that findings from this study are likely to be comparable to those of studies
conducted in stock markets in other countries. Additionally, this study excluded from the sample
those firms who are listed in the forest product industry but whose income in forest product-related
fields accounted for less than 35% of their total income in the year when a policy was released.
For the purposes of testing whether there were any differences between firms with and without
forestland holdings, this study analyzed the annual reports of publicly traded firms under these
categories for the years in which the aforementioned policies were released. If a forest product firm
had reported holding forestland—as either an asset or otherwise under its control (e.g., by leasing
contract)—the firm was classified as one with forestland; otherwise, it was classified as one without.
These firms were then classified into two further categories, based on their primary operating revenues
in a particular year: (1) timber products manufacturing and (2) furniture production and paper-making
and paper products. For example, when the primary operating revenue of a firm derives mainly from
timber processing, that firm was classified as being in timber products manufacturing.
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As a proxy for stock market returns, this study used the daily return of the Shanghai Stock
Comprehensive Index and of the Shenzhen Stock Index; this study considered any firm traded on
either of these stock exchanges. The daily stock returns of the individual firms were retrieved from the
Wind Finance database. Of the firms being identified, this study included only those whose stock price
information was continuously listed over the three-day event period and the 250-day estimation period.
This study excluded firms listed as ST or ST* (i.e., firms under special treatment who suffer
from continuous loss for two years or three years, respectively) during the aforementioned period, to
eliminate extreme values and the data contamination they can incur. This study additionally excluded
firms with potentially confounding announcements (e.g., dividends, earnings, mergers/acquisitions,
and changes in top management) during the three-day event window. Presented below are the numbers
of firms identified by following these sampling criteria for each policy, together with the analytical
results. Table 1 shows the number of firms identified at each stage of the sampling process.
Table 1. Data-screening process.
Sample Criteria Policy I Policy II Policy III Policy IV Policy V
Total number of listed firms 26 31 34 41 41
<35% of income from business relating to forest products 3 0 2 0 0
Incomplete stock prices during the estimation period 1 1 1 4 4
Denoted as ST or ST* 0 0 0 2 2
Having confounding events during the event period 1 5 7 6 6
Final sample 21 25 24 29 29
4. Results
Tables 2–6 present the average CARs by policy obtained over the three-day event window. Each
table shows the results of testing the impact of a particular policy on firm value, where firms are
classified in terms of whether or not they hold any forestland and whether the firm is in timber
products manufacturing, or in furniture production/paper-making and paper products. Positive signs
on the average CARs indicate that the presence of corresponding events increased the stock price of
these firms, while negative signs suggest the opposite. When only one firm is in a certain situation,
the direction of the impact is discussed without considering its level of significance.
As Table 2 shows, when firms with or without forestland overall are considered, the CARs are
positive and statistically significant for timber products manufacturing firms, but negative for furniture
production/paper-making and paper product firms. The CARs are also positive for timber-processing
firms that hold forestland but negative for furniture production/paper-making and paper product
firms that do not hold forestland. When examining firms across all categories, only the CARs of firms
that do not hold forestland are positive and statistically significant.
Table 2. Results of testing policy I.
Category
All Firms Firms with Forestlands Firms without Forestlands
No CAR z No CAR z No CAR z
All categories 21 0.118 0.757 17 0.023 0.167 4 0.521 ** 2.407
Timber products manufacturing 6 1.295 *** 6.555 5 0.528 *** 3.213 1 5.129 -
Furniture production, and
paper-making and paper products 15 −0.353 *** −2.999 12 −0.188 −1.577 3 −1.014 *** −10.369
Note: (1) “No” represents the number of firms; (2) For each policy, the average CARs were expressed in percentage.
(3) *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the level of 5%.
For policy II, the CARs of firms in all situations are positive and statistically significant, with the
CARs of firms that do not hold forestland demonstrating stronger magnitudes than those of firms that
hold forestland (Table 3).
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Table 3. Results of testing policy II.
Category
All Firms Firms with Forestlands Firms without Forestlands
No CAR z No CAR z No CAR z
All categories 25 1.403 *** 5.324 22 1.343 *** 4.907 3 1.839 *** 11.033
Timber products manufacturing 7 1.523 *** 4.636 6 1.397 *** 3.947 1 2.28 -
Furniture production, and
paper-making and paper products 18 1.356 *** 5.813 16 1.323 *** 5.588 2 1.619 *** 8.009
Note: (1) “No” represents the number of firms; (2) For each policy, the average CARs were expressed in percentage.
(3) *** significant at the 1% level.
Table 4 shows that, for policy III, the CARs in all situations are negative and statistically significant
save for those of firms without forestland and which fall into the furniture production/paper-making
and paper products category, which were positive.
Table 4. Results of testing policy III.
Category
All Firms Firms with Forestlands Firms without Forestlands
No CAR z No CAR z No CAR z
All categories 24 −3.054 *** −7.253 21 −3.966 *** −15.871 3 3.330 *** 3.927
Timber products manufacturing 6 −1.441 *** −6.349 6 −1.441 *** −6.349 - - -
Furniture production, and
paper-making and paper products 18 −3.592 *** −7.788 15 −4.976 *** −23.012 3 3.33 *** 3.927
Note: (1) “No” represents the number of firms; (2) For each policy, the average CARs were expressed in percentage.
(3) *** significant at the 1% level.
For policy IV, when considering firms that do and do not hold forestland as a single group, the CARs
of firms in both the timber products manufacturing category and the furniture production/paper-making
and paper products category are statically significant, with the former being negative and the latter
being positive (Table 5). The same pattern is seen for firms that hold forestland. For firms that do not
hold forestland, the CARs are negative in all cases.
Table 5. Results of testing policy IV.
Category
All Firms Firms with Forestlands Firms without Forestlands
No CAR z No CAR z No CAR z
All categories 29 −0.065 −0.291 24 0.097 0.446 5 −0.843 *** −3.396
Timber products manufacturing 8 −1.598 *** −9.718 7 −1.484 *** −8.522 1 −2.398 -
Furniture production, and
paper-making and paper products 21 0.519 ** 2.272 17 0.747 *** 3.495 4 −0.454 * −1.683
Note: (1) “No” represents the number of firms; (2) For each policy, the average CARs were expressed in percentage.
(3) *** significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the level of 5%; * significant at the level of 10%.
For policy V (Table 6), the CARs of firms that do not hold forestland are positive and statistically
significant, particularly for firms in the furniture production/paper-making and paper products category.
Table 6. Results of testing policy V.
Category
All Firms Firms with Forestlands Firms without Forestlands
No CAR z No CAR z No CAR z
All categories 29 −0.02 −0.087 25 −0.323 −1.489 4 1.877 *** 8.557
Timber products manufacturing 10 −0.31 −1.268 9 −0.398 −1.551 1 0.486 -
Furniture production, and
paper-making and paper products 19 0.133 0.627 16 −0.281 −1.471 3 2.341 *** 9.61
Note: (1) “No” represents the number of firms; (2) For each policy, the average CARs were expressed in percentage.
(3) *** significant at the 1% level.
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5. Discussion
In this section, the discussion of the findings with respect to each of the five policies examined
is presented.
5.1. Policy I: Accelerating the Development of Forestry, 2003
There is a possible explanation for the positive impacts of policy I on firms that hold forestland
and are in the timber products manufacturing category and firms in all categories that do not hold
forestland. Following the reform, these firms would have been more readily able to acquire from
the domestic timber market the raw materials needed for production, as the policy encourages the
development of forestland and possibly boosts domestic timber supply. Additionally, under the
new collective forestland tenure reform, it is possible for forest product firms to possess forestland
on their own, by securing long-term timber supply agreements (i.e., by trading certain rights to
the collective forestland with farmers). Holding their own forestland enables firms to cope with
incomplete information and uncertainty [15]. In addition, policy I encourages firms to develop their
timber production base in order to increase the domestic timber supply. It is expected that forestland
product firms will secure raw material production supplies in the future; this is especially true for
timber product manufacturing firms in particular, and firms that do not hold forestland in general.
However, it might be difficult for those firms that do not hold forestland and are in the furniture
production/paper-making and paper products category to develop their own raw material supply base:
they did not possess forestland on their own, and this could explain the negative impact of policy I on
this type of firm.
5.2. Policy II: Strengthening and Standardizing the Management of Forestland Rights Registration and
Certification, 2007
The positive impacts of policy II in all the situations might stem from the fact that holding forestland
can generally enhance a firm’s benefits. It is possible to reduce not only those production costs that
stem from direct costs incurred during the physical production process, but also transaction costs that
relate to negotiating, monitoring, enforcing, and possibly bonding to the terms of arrangements [65].
Additionally, having an abundant timber supply on the future timber market could possibly
preclude unreasonable timber-price increases, and thus reduce forest product firms’ production costs.
Because farmers tend to invest more in forestland plots where the tenure security is considered
high [66], the forestland rights registration and certification policy, which gives individual farmers
some secure rights over currently collective forestland, would allow farmers to invest in new means of
production [5,24]. Thus, the domestic timber supply derived from collective forestland is expected to
increase in the future, as Zhang and Buongiorno speculate [28]. Hence, it is possible that said policy
will push stock market investors to remain positive vis-à-vis future firm values.
5.3. Policy III: Promoting the Collective Forestland Tenure Reform, 2008
As policy III emphasizes collective forestland rights—particularly their assurance and transfer—it
makes it possible for firms to hold forestland on their own in the future, by means of forestland
transfer. Hence, this policy is likely to affect investor perception regarding the value of firms that do
not hold forestland.
In considering all the firms as a group and only the firms with forestland holdings, the finding
that policy III has had negative impacts aligns with that of Niquidet [16], namely, that the Forestry
Revitalization Plan in British Columbia, in which forestland tenure was reallocated, had a negative
impact on several forest product firms. Niquidet noted that one characteristic of these affected firms
was that they were operating almost exclusively with fiber derived from public land; as such, the
negative impact might have derived from the loss of forestland tenure and the difficulties in Canada
associated with converting property rights into forest resources [16]. Likewise, Niquidet’s findings may
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have stemmed from uncertainties vis-à-vis the future state of forestland ownership management. For
one thing, it could take a long time for the reform to be effectively implemented nationwide, even as the
various forms of forestland ownership may still be subject to reform developments. For another, timber
production is capital-intensive, which means that large amounts of capital can be tied to forestland [39];
under such circumstances, internal firm costs may increase in cases where a firm’s timberland holdings
are large [15]. In addition, because forestland and forest production are two different businesses,
conflicts may arise when firms decide to use their forestland as a supply base for their forest production
or manage them as profit centers [39].
Another possible reason for such results might be the freezing rain and snow disaster in Southern
China, which had a “great impact on the collective forest tenure reform” [67]. The disaster caused
enormous damage in the 19 provinces that constitute the primary areas of collective forestland tenure
reform. Among those 19 provinces, the collective forestland in 13 provinces, in which the collective
forestland tenure reform had been fully implemented, accounts for 65% of all collective forestland
across China [67]. As a consequence, in the wake of this natural disaster, investors might have been
pessimistic regarding the value of forest product firms that hold forestland.
5.4. Policy IV: The Reform and Improvement of Collective Forestland Logging Management, 2009
This study found that policy IV had a negative impact on firms that do not hold forestland;
this finding aligns with that of an event study conducted by Boardman, et al. [68], who found that,
compared to firms that own forestland, those that do not have worse financial performance when
logging restrictions were implemented in the 1990s in the United States. One possible explanation
for the negative impact in the Chinese context could be that timber production is still restricted to
some extent by the production quota for a certain period [28]. As indicated by policy IV, associated
reforms to the timber production quota policy should be accomplished within five years; this new
policy will replace the existing harvesting quota system with a record-keeping system [7]. Timber
product manufacturing levels might be constrained on account of the timber harvesting quota, as it
limits domestic timber supplies; this may explain the negative impact of the policy on the value of this
type of firm. However, if firms in the furniture production/paper-making and paper products category
have their own pulpwood forestland bases, then harvesting for pulpwood will be separate from the
timber harvesting quota [69]. This might, in turn, explain the divergent reactions of this type of firm,
and firms in timber product manufacturing.
5.5. Policy V: Strengthening the Management of Collective Forestland Rights Transfer, 2009
The finding that this policy has had a positive effect on firms that do not hold forestland—especially
those in the furniture production/paper-making and paper products category—might be explained by
the fact that, after the reform, it may have been easier for these firms to obtain raw production materials
from the domestic timber market. Another possible explanation is that policy V also formally permitted
forestland transfers, and this would imply the opportunity for firms that do not hold forestland to do
so through leasing, contracting, and the like. Under the new collective forestland tenure reform, forest
product firms can acquire forestland and secure long-term timber supply agreements by trading with
farmers certain rights to the collective forestland. It is expected that such an action would allow firms
to deal with incomplete information and uncertainty if they were to hold forestland [15].
6. Conclusions
This study employed an event study method to assess the effects of China’s collective forestland
tenure reform policies on forest product firm values. To that end, this study examined five policies
enacted between 2003 and 2009. This study used as events the official announcements of these policies,
and for each policy, abnormal returns were calculated for these firms. The results of this study suggest
that the impact of collective forestland tenure reform policies on forest product firm values varies from
policy to policy. Generally, firms that do not hold forestland react more strongly to policies that promote
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forestland security and forestland transfers than do firms that hold forestland. Additionally, the effects
on timber product manufacturing firms differ from those on furniture production/paper-making and
paper product firms.
The findings of this study contribute significantly to the literature. First, while most studies have
investigated the effects of reforms from the farmers perspective, the current study contributes to the
literature by elucidating the effect of the collective forestland tenure reform in China, while taking the
perspective of forest product firms. Since forest product firms are essential entities in the forest product
industry, to fully understand the impact of the reform on that industry, it is essential to examine this
issue from the viewpoint of these firms.
Second, this study responds to the call to investigate the relationship between structure
and financial performance at the firm level in the forest product industry, under the structure-
conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm [70]. In so doing, the current study validates the SCP paradigm,
in the sense that tenure reform policy is found to affect a forest product firm’s financial performance as
measured by changes in stock prices.
Third, this study provides valuable empirical evidence of the effects of collective forestland tenure
reform on the value of forest product firms with and without forestland holdings, and firms that
undertake timber products manufacturing and furniture production/paper-making and paper product
manufacturing. The outcomes of this study reveal that, from the market investor perspective, collective
forestland tenure reform policies have had very real impacts on the financial performance forest
product firms that have forestland holdings. The responses of capital markets to different policies
that relate to the collective forestland tenure reform suggest that for forest product firms that hold
forestland assets, being in possession of forestland certificates could play an important strategic role.
Hence, it is suggested that the collective forestland tenure reform should be accompanied by policies
on how to enhance the management of forestland certificates, especially among forest product firms
that hold forestland assets.
Finally, related studies have been mostly conducted in North American and European countries
(e.g., Finland [14]). Although active increases in timberland holdings among Asian forest product
firms suggest a predominantly resource-seeking motive among firms in this region, few studies
have investigated the impact of such changes in timberland holdings on Asian firms’ financial
performance [36]. The current study contributes to the literature in this respect, to show how forestland
ownership affects Asian forest product firms’ financial performance and while using Chinese forest
product firms as examples. Additionally, by using changes in stock prices as measures of change in
firm values, the current study also shows the feasibility of using an event study in forestry economics
research in the Chinese context.
The findings of this study bear important policy implications for future policy-making in terms
of the management of forestland tenure in China. For one, since forestland holdings and forestland
ownership certification have been found to play strategic roles in the anticipated value of forest
product firms, the collective forestland tenure reform should be accompanied by policies on how
to enhance the management of forestland ownership. In addition, to boost the domestic timber
supplies of forest product firms via collective forestland tenure reform, policy-makers should consider
introducing policies by which to establish a favorable and specific forest-wood logging management
mechanism and encourage collective forestland owners to increase timber production. For another, the
suggested relationship between forestland holdings and financial performance can be used to derive
suggestions on how to help Chinese forest product firms adapt to the collective forestland tenure
reform. For example, forest product firms that do not currently have forestland holdings may consider
acquiring some.
Some study limitations, as well as some possible directions for future research are noted here.
Although the results of the current study indicate that with the release of most collective forestland
tenure reform policies, the stock market has become more favorable to forest product firms that
have no timberland holdings, further research is needed to confirm the underlying reasons for this.
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Additionally, there is an ongoing debate regarding the efficiency of the Chinese stock markets, which
throws into question the trustworthiness of applying the efficient market hypothesis [71]. Further
research should be conducted to strengthen the viability of using the stock value to represent the firm
value in China and support the reliability of the results herein. Moreover, forest product firms that are
not listed on the stock market may need to interpret the results of this study with caution, as an event
study allows only for the investigation of firms for which stock prices are available. Hence, further
research may wish to take different approaches in examining the impact of the collective forestland
tenure reform on the financial performance of forest product firms not publicly traded on the stock
market, especially small or medium-sized firms. For example, future research may consider testing the
relationship by using the actual financial benefits of forestland ownership on production, whenever it
can be observed.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Summary of event studies in forest economics and related fields.
Authors Topic Region Estimation Method Sample Size Event Window Estimation Window Major Findings
Sun and Zhang [72] Industrial
timberland sales
U.S. 1. Standard event
analysis
2. Capitalization
analysis
3. Risk analysis
32 events; 11 firms (0, 3) (−80, −1) for estimation
and capitalization
analysis (4103) and
(4153) for risk analysis
1. Positive abnormal rates of
returns is associated with
timberland sales
2. Change in capitalization is
related to firms’ total asset
and sales
Sun, et al. [73] Industrial
timberland
ownership
U.S. 1. Standard Event
analysis
2. Event analysis with
GARCH modeling
3. Event-induced
volatility
24 events; 24 firms (−15, 15) (−265, −16) 1. Negative impact for
timberland sales by forest
firms and acquisitions by Real
estate investment trusts
(REITs)
2. Positive impact for
conversions to REITs
Bouslah, et al. [74] Forest certification Canada and U.S. 1. Standard event
analysis
2. Buy-and-hold
abnormal return
(BHAR) approach
151 events; 42
firms
(−1, +1) (−10, 10) 1. 36 months before the
certification
announcements month
for stand event analysis
2. 36 months following
the certifications
announcements month
for the BHAR approach
1. No significant impact on
firms’ financial performance
in the short run
2. Negative impact on firms’
financial performance in the
long run.
Zhang and Binkley [34] Forest policy
change on
harvesting rights
Canada 1. Standard event
analysis
2. Multiple regression
analysis
three events; 11
firms
(−8, 14) 147 days ending two
weeks prior to the
announcement date
1. Negative, but not
statistically significant impact
on all firms
2. Small but statistically
insignificant negative impact
on medium-sized firms that
own little private land and
operate mainly locally
3. No impact on large local
firms and non−local firms
Binkley and Zhang [35] Timber−fee
increase
Canada Standard event study 1 event; 12 firms (−27, 5) 218 days 1. Negative impact
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Table A2. Summary of event studies in forest economics and related fields (continued).
Authors Topic Region Estimation Method Sample Size Event Window Estimation Window Major Findings
Niquidet [16] Forest
Revitalization Plan
Canada Standard event study one event; 13 firms (0) 448 trading days Negative impact on several
firms
Ho, et al. [75] Bankruptcy North America Standard event study Four events; four
firms
(−20, 5) (−250, −50) 1. Negative market reaction to
a bankruptcy announcement
for pulp and paper firms.
Mei and Sun [76] Merger and
acquisitions
(M&A)
U.S. 1. Standard event
study
2. Risk analysis
1. 70 events; 90
firms for standard
event study
2. 14 events; 90
firms for risk
analysis
(−7, 7) (−5, 5) (−3,
3) (−1, 1)
1. 200 days before
selected event window
for standard event study
2. 50,100, and 150 days
after the event window
for risk analysis
1. Positive impact over the
15-day event windows and
the 3-day event window
Sun and Liao [44] Litigation under
the Endangered
Species Act (ESA)
on forest products
firms
U.S. 1. Standard event
study
2. Risk analysis
six events; 14 firms (−2, 2) (−3, 3) (−4,
4) (−5, 5) (−6, 6)
(−7, 7)
1. 250 days before
selected event window
for standard event study
2. 50,100, and 150 days
before and after the
event window for risk
analysis
1. Four cases generated either
positive or negative impacts.
Mendell, et al. [77] Timberlands
structured as real
estate investment
trusts (REIT)
U.S. Standard event
analysis
four events; four
firms
(−5, 5) (−105, −6) 1. Positive impact on stock
prices
Malhotra and Gulati [78] The 1996
U.S.-Canada
Softwood Lumber
Agreement
U.S. Standard event
analysis
one event; 37 firms (−1, 1) (−2, 2) (−3,
3) (−5, 5)
(−369, −31) (365 days) 1. Negative impacts on the
stock prices
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